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This paper shows how badly a market economy 
may respond to a positive productivity shock in an 
environment with asymmetric information about project 
quality: some, all, or even more than all the benefits 
from the increase in productivity may be dissipated. 
In the model, based on Bernanke and Gertler (1990), 
entrepreneurs with a low default probability are charged 
the same interest rate as entrepreneurs with a high default 
probability. The implicit subsidy from good types to bad 
means that the marginal entrant will have a negative-
value project. An example is presented in which, after 
a positive productivity shock, the presence of enough 
bad types forces the interest rate so high that it drives 
all entrepreneurs out of the market. This happens in 
This paper—a product of the Macroeconomics and Growth Team, Development Research Group—is part of a larger effort 
in the department to understand problems of financial markets and governance. Policy Research Working Papers are also 
posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at khoff@worldbank.org.  
an industry in which there are good projects that are 
productive. The problem is that they are contaminated in 
the capital market by bad projects because of the banks’ 
inability to distinguish good projects from bad. 
   One possible explanation for the lack of development 
in some countries, is that screening institutions are 
sufficiently weak that impersonal financial markets 
cannot function. If industrialization entails learning 
spillovers concentrated within national boundaries, and if 
initially informational asymmetries are sufficiently great 
that the capital market does not emerge, then neither 
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The  problem  of  financial  fragility  has  received  a  great  deal  of  attention.    It  is  well 
understood  that  a  negative  shock  to  wealth,  prices,  or  beliefs  can  lead  to  the  collapse  of  a 
financial market.
1  It  is  less well understood that  markets  can also  become unstable  after a 
positive  shock.    Here  I  show  that  a  positive  productivity  shock  can  increase  the  extent  of 
asymmetric information in the market as it draws in low-quality borrowers.  It can even happen 
that a positive shock leads to a complete collapse of investment.  
These points are made by analysis of the process of investment finance in Bernanke and 
Gertler (1990). They showed that their model has a ― fragile‖ equilibrium in the sense that it can 
be greatly disturbed by a negative wealth shock. What I show here is that under some conditions, 
a positive productivity shock can also cause negative movements in the equilibrium, and possibly 
large movements.  In the model, entrepreneurs who want to undertake investment projects know 
their  probability  of  success,  but  financial  intermediaries  know  only  the  average  success 
probability of entrants, and the marginal entrant has the highest risk of failure.  In this setting, the 
marginal entrant will have a negative-value project.  The high-quality borrowers subsidize the 
low-quality borrowers. A positive shock that increases the success return to projects will attract a 
new set  of  high-risk,  negative-value projects.    This  adverse selection  process  will erode  the 
ability  rents  of the inframarginal borrowers.    I present an example in which it destroys  the 
market.    
The results of this paper suggest a new reason why institutional change in the financial 
sector has often followed technological progress.  The usual explanation is that an explosion of 
demand for funds can be met only by a widening of the financial market across group boundaries 
and  geographic  distance,  which  decreases  trust  and  increases  the  extent  of  asymmetric 
information (e.g., Zucker 1986 and Baskin 1988).  The additional explanation suggested in this 
paper is that a productivity improvement in an industry can widen the divergence of interests 
between entrepreneurs and banks, which provides potentially large returns to improvements in 
institutions for economic governance.  The returns can be as much as the entire value produced 
in the industry, which is at risk of dissipation from financing of negative-value projects.    
                                                 
1 See, for example, Bernanke and Gertler (1990), Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993), and Morris and Shin (2008).  3 
 
For instance, the first century of investment in railroads in the United States has been 
described as a ― long story of defaults, reorganizations, frauds, and other pitfalls and mishaps 
[that] may give the impression that it was at best a question of avoiding losses instead of making 
profits" (Veenendaal, 1996, p. 175).  The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) emerged as the 
central  market  for  railroad  securities  and  devised  a  set  of  screening  policies  that  became 
progressively more stringent after 1860.   ― Market screening undertaken by the New York Stock 
Exchange allowed certain firms to invest in costly signals to separate their securities from those 
of competing ventures.…A NYSE listing itself became a signal to American investors of the 
‗quality‘ of an investment opportunity‖ (Davis and Cull, 1994, pp. 74-75).  The literature on 
financial market development explains this change by the geographical expansion of the market.  
However, another factor that may have contributed to the recurrent need for improvements in 
screening  was  that  technological  progress  widened  the  divergence  of  interests  between 
entrepreneurs and banks, as entrepreneurs faced higher incentives to take long-shot gambles with 
other people‘s money.  
There are many markets in which the marginal entrant is the lowest quality type.  For 
example, in markets in which quality is not observable at the time of purchase and firms differ in 
the marginal cost of producing quality, the lowest ability firms will choose to produce the lowest 
quality goods.  In such a setting, Grossman and Horn (1988) show that high-ability firms will 
choose to build a reputation over time for high quality, and the lowest ability firms will choose to 
sell shoddy goods (which they can sell at the price of the average quality) and then exit.  The 
marginal entrant will produce negative social value.  
The surprising result that positive shocks may cause negative outcomes cannot, however, 
occur in the model in Akerlof‘s seminal paper on the market for ― lemons‖ (Akerlof 1970). As 
Akerlof writes of his model of the used car market, ― The bad cars tend to drive out the good‖ (p. 
489). There is always too little exchange in his model because the marginal seller, having the 
highest  quality  used  car  in  the  market,  receives  less  than  its  true  value.    In  contrast,  I  am 
concerned with the opposite problem, as were also de Meza and Webb (1987) and Grossman and 
Horn (1988).  If exchange occurs at all, there is always too much of it because the marginal 
investor, having the worst project and the greatest risk, borrows at a better than fair interest rate.  
The good types  draw in  the  bad.    Under some conditions,  a  positive shock  can  worsen  the 
problem of too much entry.   4 
 
 
1.  A model of the financial market in which good types draw in bad 
 
A.  The agents and technology 
 
There  are  two  groups  of  agents:    entrepreneurs  and  financial  intermediaries  (― banks‖).    All 
agents are risk-neutral.  An entrepreneur chooses whether or not to invest an indivisible level of 
effort at utility cost e to design a project.   Each entrepreneur can design at most one project.  A 
project is an independent draw from the distribution H(p), where p is the probability that the 
project  succeeds.    A project  pays  off  R  if it succeeds  and zero otherwise.    A byproduct  of 
designing a project is that the entrepreneur learns the probability of success of the project, which 
he then chooses whether or not to undertake.  Undertaking it requires an investment of one unit 
of wealth.  Entrepreneurs have a wealth endowment W that is strictly positive but less than one, 
so that they must obtain outside finance to undertake their projects.  There are a large number of 
financial intermediaries, each with an unlimited supply of funds at gross interest rate r.  r reflects 
the gross return on resources that are stored, rather than invested. 
 
B.  The financial contract 
 
Contracts  must  be  based  on  observables.  The  following  assumptions  restrict  the  set  of 
observables in a way that introduces the problem of adverse selection into the financial market 
and ensures that no feasible contract can solve it. 
 
Assumption 1. The distribution of p is known to all, but the specific realization of p is each 
entrepreneur‘s private information. 
 
Assumption 2. The entrepreneur's effort cannot be monitored. 
 
Assumption 3. A bank cannot observe all the financial contracts that an entrepreneur enters into.  
  Together  with  limited  liability,  Assumption  1  creates  a  potential  problem  of  adverse 
selection.  Assumption 2 means that the problem cannot be solved by offering a fixed wage 5 
 
contract to entrepreneurs, since under such a contract the entrepreneur would have no incentive 
to  expend  effort.    Assumption  3  means  that  it  is  not  feasible  to  mitigate  the  incentive  of 
entrepreneurs to undertake bad projects by designing a contract in which a payment is made from 
the bank to the entrepreneur in the event that he does not undertake a project. To see this, notice 
that if an entrepreneur's success probability was so low that he did not wish to undertake his 
project, he would have an incentive to enter into such a contract with every intermediary and 
accept the grants. If, alternatively, his success probability was high enough that he wished to 
undertake his project, then he would have an incentive to sign a simple debt contract.  Hence, a 
contract that provided for a payment to the entrepreneur when he did not undertake a project 
(thereby  inducing  the  entrepreneurs  with  the  worst  projects  to  withdraw  from  the  financial 
market) would not be self-sustaining. 
  Given  these  assumptions,  the  contract  that  maximizes  each  entrepreneur‘s  expected 
income subject to the constraint that the bank breaks even is a pure debt contract with maximum 
self-finance.  The proof follows the lines of Bernanke and Gertler (1990, proposition 2(i)).  The 
intuition for maximum self-finance is that the unwillingness of a risk-neutral entrepreneur to 
invest in his own project would signal that it was of poor quality.   
  Under the equilibrium contract, the entrepreneur pays principal and interest if his project 
succeeds, and defaults if his project fails.  Let i denote 1 + the interest rate.  I will generally refer 
to i as ―the  interest rate,‖ for short. 
 
C.  Overview of the game and the equilibrium 
 
Competition is modeled as a three-stage game: 
   
In Stage 1, an entrepreneur decides whether or not to design a project.   
  In Stage 2, banks offer contracts to entrepreneurs.   
  In Stage 3, entrepreneurs decide whether or not to accept the offers.   
 
  Proceeding by backward induction, consider in Stage 3 an entrepreneur who has already 
designed a project and learned its success probability p.  He will wish to undertake his project if 
it is at least as profitable as the alternative use of his wealth.  This implies p[R – i[1-W]]  ≥   rW  6 
 
or, equivalently, that projects with success probabilities equal to or above p* are undertaken, 
where 
 
 (1)      p*  =  
?𝑊
𝑅−?  1−𝑊  .     Entrepreneurs’ reservation success probability  (RSP)  
     
    
   
  In  Stage  2,  there  is  perfect  competition  in  the  lending  activity.    Financial  market 
equilibrium occurs at an interest rate at which banks break even in expected value:  
 
(2)           ? =
?
?                  Banks’ break-even locus 
 
where ?  denotes the average success probability of entrepreneurs who borrow.  If, for example, 
there are a continuum of types and no mass point at p*, then 
 
(3)                      ?  =  E(?|? ≥ ?∗)         
 
Thus,  the  contracts  offered  in  Stage  2  depend  on  the  banks‘  expectation  of  entrepreneurs‘ 
response in Stage 3. 
  Consider finally the entrepreneur‘s problem in Stage 1.  He will find it worthwhile to 
invest effort to design a project if the expected return is positive:  
 
(4)            𝑦 = 𝜋[? 𝑅 − ?] − ?  ≥   0 ,   
 
where π is the probability that an entrepreneur who designs a project will choose in Stage 3 to 
undertake it.  This inequality implies a lower bound on wealth below which an entrepreneur loses 
access to credit.
2 I assume initially, by choice of parameters, that (4) is satisfied.   
  The process of investment finance described by equations (1) to (3) has the consequence 
                                                 
2 The intuition is that the lower the entrepreneur‘s wealth, the lower his stake in his project and thus the lower the 
probability of success p* at which he is willing to undertake a project.  Hence, the lower is W, the lower the average 
quality of borrowers and the higher the interest rate.  This rate may be so high that (4) is violated.  Bernanke and 
Gertler (1990) prove the existence of a critical wealth level below which the market collapses.  Without loss of 
generality, I consider in this paper only one wealth level.  With a distribution of wealth levels across entrepreneurs, 
one would have a distribution of markets, each with its own interest rate.  Point by point, the results in this paper 
would hold for each level of wealth. 7 
 
that entrepreneurs are willing to undertake negative social value projects.  The social return to 
the entrepreneur who is indifferent between undertaking his project, or not, is p*R-r.  p*R-r is 
negative since   
 
(5)      p* = 
?
𝑅     𝑊  + [1  −  𝑊] 
  ?∗





using (1) and (2) and the fact that p* <  ? .  Thus, the good types draw in the bad to the financial 
market. 
 
D.  The equilibrium with a discrete distribution of types   
 
In order to better show the intuition behind the results of this paper, in the text I will focus on the 
case of a discrete distribution of types.  In the appendix, I will present the case of a continuous 
distribution of types.   
  I now assume that the probability of success for projects is either pL or pH , with 0 < pL < 
pH < 1, and that the two types exist in proportions λ and 1-λ, respectively.   I will refer to an 
entrepreneur with a project success probability pL (respectively, pH) as the low (high) ability 
type.
3  
  Figure 1 depicts the banks’ break-even locus (equation (2)).  With discrete types, the 
locus is a step function.  For p* < pL, the interest rate is r/E(p), where E(p) is the unconditional 
expectation.  For p* > pL, the interest rate declines to r/pH.   The banks‘ break-even locus shows 
how individual behavior aggregates up to the market interest rate. 
  Figure 1 also depicts the entrepreneurs’ reservation success probability (RSP in equation 
(1)). The curve is upward sloping because at a higher interest rate, the entrepreneur requires a 
higher success probability to be willing to invest in his project.  
 
FIGURE 1.  Equilibrium with two types of entrepreneurs.  In panel (A), the success return R is low 
and the marginal borrower is high ability.  In panel (B), the success return is Rʹ (with Rʹ > R) and 
                                                 
3 The case of two types generalizes fully to an arbitrary number of discrete types.  This can be seen by considering the 
average success probability of inframarginal types in equilibrium as the composite type ― pH‖ and by considering the 
success probability of the next worst type as ― pL.‖ 8 
 
the marginal borrower is low ability. 
   
 
   
  Equilibrium  occurs  at  the  intersection  of  the  two  curves.    If  they  intersect  along  a 
horizontal segment of the banks‘ break-even locus, a small shock with have no effect on entry.  
This case occurs if pL < p* (only the high-ability type undertakes projects), as shown in panel 
(A), or if pL > p* (all entrepreneurs undertake their projects, not shown in the figure).     
  In  the  alternative  case,  as  shown  in  panel  (B),  the  two  curves  will  intersect  along  a 
vertical segment of the banks‘ break-even locus, where pL = p*.  I will call this ― the intermediate 
case.‖ Given the result in (5), the intermediate case is one in which there are some entrepreneurs 
who should undertake their projects and some who should not, and the latter are at the margin of 
entry.
4  Let q ∈ [0,1] denote the fraction of low-ability entrepreneurs that undertake their projects.   
  With a discrete distribution of p, the average success probability of entrepreneurs that 
undertake their projects is a step function 
 
(3ʹ)     ?  =
?𝜆?𝐿+[1−𝜆]?𝐻
?𝜆+1−𝜆   if  ?∗ = ?𝐿                  (the intermediate case) 
 
(3ʹʹ)    ?  = ?𝐻        if  ?∗ > ?𝐿     
 
(3ʹʹʹ)       ?  = ? ?    if ?∗ < ?𝐿   
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(3ʹ) says that a fraction qλ+1-λ of all entrepreneurs undertakes projects, and of these qλ are low 
quality and 1- λ are high quality.   
  Equations  (2) and (3ʹ)  describe the Nash  equilibrium  for the intermediate case. Each 
entrepreneur‘s action is at least tied for his best response to the interest rate charged by the 
banks, and no bank has an incentive to deviate from that interest rate.  To see why this is the 
Nash equilibrium, note that if more than this value of q entered the industry, the interest rate 
would rise.  At that higher interest rate, p* > pL, so that all the low-ability entrepreneurs would 
exit, and banks would earn strictly positive profits. Thus, this cannot be an equilibrium.  If less 
than this value of q entered, the interest rate would fall.  At that lower interest rate, p* < pL.  All 
the low-ability entrepreneurs would enter and so banks would suffer losses. This also cannot be 
an equilibrium.   
  Normalizing the number of entrepreneurs to one, y in (4) defines the social surplus.  In 
the intermediate case, it is  
 
(4ʹ)        𝑦|?∗=?𝐿  =  (qλ + 1 – λ) (? R – r) – e.   
 
The factor ? R-r is, of course, the average income of entrepreneurs who undertake their projects.  
All  entrepreneurs  with  high-quality projects  undertake them, but  as  explained above,  only a 
fraction q of the entrepreneurs who have low-quality projects do so. The first factor, qλ + 1 – λ, 
is thus the probability that an entrepreneur who designs a project chooses to undertake it.  From 
this overall return, the cost of project design, e, must be subtracted. 





?   1 − 𝑊 .   
 
Rearranging this equation gives a useful result: 
 
(6)      ? R −?   =   ?𝑊 
?  − ?𝐿
?𝐿
           
   
This means that in the intermediate case, any social surplus that is produced arises because the 
inframarginal type (the high-ability type) is producing enough relative to the marginal type (the 
low-ability type), and because there are enough of the high-ability type (i.e.,  1  –  λ  is  large 
enough) to offset the design costs e.  The next section will show that under some conditions, a 10 
 
broadly beneficial productivity shock will erode this social surplus.   
 
2.  Technological progress 
 
Technological progress, or a positive shock to productivity, potentially affects aggregate income 
in two ways:  a direct income-increasing effect holding the composition of the industry fixed, 
and an indirect effect from the change in the set of entrepreneurs who enter the industry.  With a 
discrete distribution of types, the second effect from a marginal shock will occur only in the 
― intermediate case,‖ because it is only in this case that there is a type at the margin of entry. 
  This section considers three kinds of technological change:  (a) an increase in the return 
of projects  that succeed, (b) an increase in  the success  probability of  each type,  and (c)  an 
increase in the return of projects that fail. Consider first an initial equilibrium in which there is 
no type at the margin of entry.  Then a marginal increase in R or in both pL and pH will not 
change the mix of types who undertake projects or the probability of entry (π in equation (4)). 
There is a simple outcome:  owners of projects get a higher return. It is trivial to see that an 
increase in R or in both pL and pH must increase y.  I will now show that in the intermediate case, 
i.e, when the low-quality type is at the margin of entry, something very different happens.  
 
A.  An increase in the return, R 
 
An increase in the success return lowers p* at a given interest rate, which shifts RSP left in Figure 
2.   In the intermediate case, the social surplus is invariant with respect to a change in R, as can be 
seen by substituting (6) into (4ʹ), to obtain an expression for y in which R does not appear:    
 
(7)  𝑦|?∗ =?𝐿  =  ?𝑊  
?𝜆?𝐿+  1− 𝜆 ?𝐻
?𝐿
 −  ?𝜆 + 1 − 𝜆   −  ?    
      
 
      =   ?𝑊[1 − 𝜆] 
?𝐻
?𝐿
− 1  − ? 
 
 
            The reason for this invariance result is that when the low-ability type is at the  margin of 
entry, an increase in R is exactly offset by a rise in the interest rate in response to the entry of more 11 
 
low-ability types.  The new entrants impose a cost on high-quality borrowers, which they do not 
take into account.   As q rises from 0 to 1, the interest rate rises from r/pH  to  r/E(p).  These effects 
are similar to externalities that occur when a market is missing.
5   
 
FIGURE 2.   Comparative statics of an increase in the success return 
 
 
           
 
  The invariance of income to a general improvement in productivity is a new application of 
an old result, the ― tragedy of the commons.‖  Gordon (1954) showed that if the supply of potential 
entrants to the commons, e.g, an open-access fisheries, was infinitely elastic, then the value of the 
commons would be exactly dissipated. The analogy to the commons in the model presented here are 
the ability rents to high-quality projects. If banks do not distinguish low-quality from high-quality 
borrowers, then a part of the ability rents of high-quality borrowers becomes, in effect, a common-
property resource subject to the tragedy of the commons. Improvements in technology that increase 
R and thereby induce a larger fraction of the low-quality type to implement their projects will 
dissipate the gains from the improvement in technology.  
            Gordon also showed that if the supply of potential entrants to the commons was less than 
                                                 
5  Greenwald  and  Stiglitz  (1986)  provide  a  general  framework  that  recasts  information  inefficiencies  in  an 
externalities framework.  12 
 
infinitely elastic, then the rents attributable to the variable factor, e.g., the fish, would be only partly 
dissipated.  The Appendix shows that this result also carries over to the investment process analyzed 
here.   
            Figure 3 illustrates the erosion of the potential gains from technological progress when the 
low-ability type is at the margin of entry.  In this example
6, r = 1, W = 0.7, e = 0.36, pL = 0.2, pH = 
0.8, and λ = 0.8.  The upper panel plots q against R.   
 
FIGURE 3.  Effect of an increase in R on entry and the social surplus 
 
 
The lower panel plots y against R.  The figure shows that in equilibrium, when q is increasing, y is 
flat:  over this range, all potential gains from the increase in R are eroded.
7 These curves can be 
contrasted with the dotted curves for a first-best economy (in which banks can distinguish between 
good and bad types).   
                                                 
6 The Matlab programs to produce Figures 3 and 5 are at www.econ.worldbank.org/staff/khoff. 
7 The same kind of analysis shows that if the innovation in the success returns of projects R is biased toward type L, then 
social surplus may fall as a result of the innovation. There are many instances in which firms at the margin are different 
from the best firms, and so a non-uniform technological change is natural. For example, in the trucking business the 
marginal firms may be those whose entrepreneurs have the lowest ability to repair trucks.  In that case, the marginal 
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B. An increase in the probabilities of success  
 
Next consider a technological innovation in the form of a rightward shift in the distribution from 
{pL, pH; λ, 1-λ} to {pL+Δ, pH+Δ; λ, 1-λ}.  The innovation causes the banks‘ break-even curve to 
shift down (entrepreneurs are more likely to repay) and right (at any value of p*, the set of types 
for which p  p* weakly increases).  See Figure 4.  In the intermediate case, the new equilibrium 
entails a higher interest rate, since more low-ability types enter the market (just as they did in 
response to an increase in R). 
   
FIGURE 4.  Comparative statics of an increase in the probabilities of success 
   
 
 
  To assess the impact on y, it is useful to decompose y into three terms: (a) the income earned 
by low-quality borrowers, plus (b) the income earned by high-quality borrowers, less (c) the design 
cost, as follows:  
(8)                    𝑦|?∗=?𝐿+ Δ =  𝜆?  ?𝐿 + Δ  𝑅 − ? 1 − 𝑊     ?𝑊  
                                                   
            +   1 − 𝜆   ?𝐻 + Δ  𝑅 − ? 1 − 𝑊    ?𝑊  −  ?    
 14 
 
If the low-quality type is on the margin, then R - i[1-W] =  rW/[pL + Δ].  This fact implies that the 
expression for (a) is equal to zero.  A marginal productivity change that increases the success 
probability of the low-ability type makes this type no better off (although it increases the fraction of 
this type who implement their projects as compared to the case in which the low-ability type had a 
probability of success pL).  Using the above fact to rewrite the expression for (b), (8) becomes  
 
(9)          𝑦|?∗=?𝐿+ Δ =    1 − 𝜆 ?𝑊 
?𝐻−?𝐿
?𝐿 + Δ  −  ? . 
 
   
  (9) means that the surplus y is strictly decreasing in Δ in the intermediate case.  The intuition 
is easy to explain.   A rise in the interest rate for all borrowers that would hold constant the net 
income of the low-quality type, who has only a low probability of actually repaying his loan, would 
entail a decline in the net income of the high-quality type, who has a high probability of repaying 
his  loan.  Formally,  the  indifference  curves  of  the  low-  and  high-quality  types  satisfy  a  single-
crossing property in the space of i and Δ. 
  Differentiating (9) with respect to Δ gives 
 
 10                             
?𝑦
?Δ|?∗=?𝐿+ Δ
  = −  1 − 𝜆 ?𝑊
?𝐻 − ?𝐿
(?𝐿 + Δ)2 <   0. 
 
 
The absolute value of dy/dΔ is increasing in the level of debt finance (rW), in the fraction of good 
projects (1- λ), and in the gap in success rates between good and bad types (pH-pL).  Each of these 
factors contributes to the rents that the low-quality types dissipate when they enter the market. The 
absolute value in (10) is also larger the lower the success probability of the low-quality type, pL + Δ.  
The lower this probability, the greater the externality that the low-quality type imposes on others.   
  Figure 5 presents an example in which the adverse selection problem leads to a collapse of 
investment by reducing below zero the entrepreneur‘s expected return y to designing a project.  The 
values of the fixed parameters, including the initial values of pL= 0.2 and pH  = 0.8, are the same as 
in Figure 3, and the value of R is now fixed at 3.6.  The upper panel plots q against a uniform shift 
(Δ) in pL and pH .   The lower panel plots y against Δ.  The figure shows that when q is strictly 
increasing, the surplus is strictly decreasing.  That is, the entry of the low-quality type erodes more 
than 100 percent of the potential gains from the increase in success probabilities.  These curves can 15 
 
be contrasted with the dotted curves for the first-best economy, in which types are observable to 
banks.  The paths diverge at the point where the low-ability type first enters the market.  The curves 
meet again at the point at which Δ is sufficiently great that the low-ability type produces positive 
social value (in this example, at Δ  ≈ 0.08). y dips below zero in the interval Δ ∈ (0.04, 0.06). Within 
this interval, in a rational expectations equilibrium, entrepreneurs would be unwilling to design 
projects that would be financed at an interest rate that banks would be willing to offer.    The pres- 
 
FIGURE 5.  Effect of an increase in the probabilities of success 
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ence of enough bad types forces the interest rate so high that it drives all entrepreneurs out of the 
market.  This happens in an industry in which there are good projects that are productive.  The 
problem is that they are contaminated in the capital market by bad projects because of the banks‘ 
inability to distinguish good projects from bad.  
 
C.  An increase in the returns to projects if they fail 
 
Up to now I have assumed that a project either succeeds and pays off R, or fails and pays off 
zero.  Suppose now that a technological change occurs in the form of an increase in the return 
when a project fails.  Assume that this return is less than r[1-W]. Then if a given project fails, the 
bank  will  receive  this  return.    In  contrast  to  the  preceding  cases,  this  technological  change 
reduces the externality imposed by low-ability entrepreneurs on high-ability entrepreneurs. Thus, 
the  technological  change  unambiguously  increases  the  surplus.    This  can  be  seen 
diagrammatically in Figure 1 (A and B) by noting that this kind of technological change would 
shift down the banks‘ break-even locus, lowering i.  At the lower interest rate, each entrepreneur 
who would have undertaken his project absent the innovation is made strictly better off; a new 
set of entrepreneurs may undertake their projects and can be no worse off; and the banks break 
even.   
 
3.  Discussion 
The results have been developed in the context of specific model of the investment process.  
They can be generalized to a wider set of models.  The results depend on three key assumptions.   
The first is a specific assumption about asymmetric information:  among a class of borrowers 
who know their distribution of future returns but who are indistinguishable to banks, borrowers 
can be ranked by first-order stochastic dominance (as in Black and de Meza 1994).  The second 
is  that  there  is  perfect  competition  among  financial  intermediaries,  with  an  infinitely  elastic 
supply of funds.  The third is an assumption about technology:  there is a fixed cost of designing 
a  project  and  evaluating  its  success  probability.    The  first  two  assumptions  mean  that  an 
entrepreneur would be willing to undertake a negative-value project, since the downside risk is 
borne partly by others whereas he benefits fully from the upside risk; but that borrowers as a 
whole will fully bear the costs of the defaults. The last assumption means that if externalities 17 
 
from the bad projects are sufficiently great, there will be no incentive to design and evaluate any 
project, and so investment will collapse.  
  An  episode  from  U.S.  history  provides  an  example  in  which  the  emergence  of  new 
institutions to reduce the extent of asymmetric information may have been causally related to 
major technological changes that widened the gap between the highest and lowest quality types 
in the market.  The railroad gave rise to a vast increase in the demand for capital that could be 
met only in a national or international financial market.  The capital used in the U.S. railroad 
industry increased from $0.3 billion in 1850 to $9-$10 billion in 1890 and to $21.1 billion in 
1916 (Mitchie 1987, p. 222).  The New York Stock Exchange, a cartel of traders with fixed 
commission rates, emerged as the central market for railroad securities by the 1870s.  In an effort 
to reduce informational asymmetries, the NYSE devised a set of screening policies that became 
progressively more stringent after 1860 (Mitchie, p. 198). The most obvious ones were its vetting 
procedure, which required potential listings to meet high minimum standards in terms of size of 
capital, number of shareholders, and proven track record.  Listing on the NYSE was voluntary 
and provided a signal to investors of the quality of an investment opportunity, enabling firms to 
build a national market for their securities.  Despite competition from other market exchanges 
with lower standards, the price of a seat on the NYSE rose from about $20,000 to $80,000 
between 1880 and 1910 (Davis and Cull, 1994, p. 74).  What the NYSE did is to bestow labels.  
With technological progress that increased rents to high ability, defining and establishing rights 
to those labels became especially valuable. 
  This idea can be formalized in a simple way.  Suppose there exists a screening technology 
such that banks can perfectly identify a project‘s success probability at a fixed cost c per project 
screened.  Then an entrepreneur with success probability pj would wish to be screened if 
 
(11)                       [1-W]r + c <   ?? [1-W] 
?
?   
The left-hand side is the expected cost of principal plus interest if he is screened, plus the cost of 
screening.  The right-hand side is the expected cost of principal plus interest if he is not screened.  A 
positive technological change that causes the set of entrants to extend deeper into the distribution of 
potential entrants reduces ? , which increases the right-hand side of (11) for any given value of pj.  
Thus, the change can shift the economy from a no-screening equilibrium to a screening equilibrium, 
in the language of Stiglitz (1975).   18 
 
  The  success  of  the  NYSE  rested  upon  the  self-interest  of  its  members  and  of  the 
entrepreneurs who sought capital.  By 1912 it is estimated that 45 percent of the $58 billion of 
securities in  circulation  in  the U.S.  were to  be  found on the  NYSE.   The provision of this 
secondary market made an enormous difference to the willingness of investors to buy and hold 
securities of firms listed on the exchange, facilitated the movement of capital within the U.S. and 
internationally,  and by reducing  asymmetric information  about  the value of securities, made 
possible an enormous expansion of lending based on stocks and bonds as collateral (Mitchie, pp. 
168, 235). 
 
4.  Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I showed how badly a market economy may respond to a positive productivity 
shock in an environment with asymmetric information about the quality of projects:  some, all, or 
more than all of the possibilities of an increase in wealth may run to waste, and investment may 
even  collapse.    These  results  have  close  parallels  to  the  ― tragedy  of  the  commons.‖    In  a 
commons with an infinitely elastic supply of entrants, the rents to the common-property resource 
are fully dissipated.  The saying that ― everybody‘s property is nobody‘s property‖ captures the 
idea.  In the model of this paper, banks cannot distinguish good projects from bad.   Thus the 
entrepreneur with a good project financed partly by debt cannot fully appropriate the surplus 
produced by his ability.  The result is a pattern of entry of entrepreneurs in response to positive 
productivity  shocks  that,  under  some  conditions,  will  dissipate  the  promised  gains  from  the 
technological improvement.  This is the ― tragedy.‖   
  The  analogy  to  the  tragedy  of  the  commons  helps  explain  why  positive  productivity 
shocks  can  dramatically  increase  both  the  social  and  private  returns  to  screening.    An 
entrepreneur whose type is identified would appropriate all the rents to his ability; this would 
remove the commons problem.  Conventional wisdom has it that the gains to better firms from 
screening are largely at the expense of the firms with which they would otherwise be grouped; 
and thus the social returns to screening are ambiguous.  However, in this model, before actually 
developing a project, every entrepreneur has the same potential to develop a good or bad project 
and  so  to  be  a  high-  or  low-quality  entrepreneur.    There  are  no  ex  ante  distributional 
consequences of screening.  What screening does is to discourage entry by entrepreneurs who 19 
 
learn that they have negative-value projects—and who by implementing them would expect to 
receive gains less than the costs (the externalities) that they would impose on other borrowers in 
the market.  The social returns to screening are thus unambiguously positive.  
  The creation of screening mechanisms has, however, historically been a slow, difficult 
process.  There are many possible routes that institutional change can take.  They include not 
only stock exchanges that serve as screens, but also innovations in guarantees, bankruptcy laws, 
and  governance  structures  within  firms.    For  example,  Acemoglu  (1998)  argues  that  the 
separation of ownership from control may have occurred in part as a remedy to the kinds of 
distortions  in  entrepreneurs‘  incentives  that  are  analyzed  here.    The  dynamics  between 
technological  change  and  institutional  change  is  a  central  aspect  of  economic  development.  
There is a two-way causal relationship.  Good institutions for economic governance enable a 
country to deploy its resources in high-value projects, which can spur technological progress.  
Technological progress may exacerbate adverse selection and lead to a crisis (an investment 
collapse), which can spur improvements in economic governance.   
  One possible explanation for the lack of development in some countries is that screening 
institutions  are  sufficiently  weak  that  impersonal  financial  markets  cannot  function.    If 
industrialization  entails  ― self-discovery‖—the  discovery  of  opportunities  for  profit—and  of 
innovation  with  spillovers  concentrated  within  national  boundaries  (see  e.g.,  Hoff  1997, 
Hausman and Rodrik 2003,  and  Greenwald  and Stiglitz 2006), and if initially informational 
asymmetries are sufficiently great that the capital market does not emerge because of the tragedy 
of the commons, then neither industrialization nor the learning that it would foster will occur.  If 
the process of developing better screens also entails knowledge spillovers concentrated within 
national  boundaries,  then  an  economy  may  be  trapped  in  an  inefficient  non-screening 
equilibrium, with no industrialization and no screening.   
 
Appendix:   A Continuous Distribution of Types of Entrepreneurs 
 
The text established two surprising results for the special case of a discrete distribution of types 
when the low-ability type is at the margin of entry:    dy/dR = 0 and  dy/dΔ  < 0.  The appendix 
shows that these effects are also possible in the case of a continuum of types, but other outcomes 
(that are not perverse) are possible, too.    20 
 
Let  p be distributed according to  the  continuously differentiable  distribution function 
H(p) with density function h(.)  > 0  if  p ∈  [0 , pu], and h(.) = 0 otherwise.  Thus pu is the upper 
bound.   
The  model  is  set  out  in  equations  (1)-(5)  in  the  text.  Given  p*,  the  mean  success 
probability of borrowers in (3) and the social surplus in (4) are     
 
 






   
           y  =  1 − 𝐻(?∗) (? R – r) – e .       
 
Henceforth, to simplify the notation, let H* denote H(p*) and h* denote h(p*).  
Figure 1-A illustrates the equilibrium. It differs from Figure 1 in that the banks‘ break-
even curve is not a step function but instead slopes down everywhere. This means that anything 
that shifts the RSP curve will change p* and, by implication, ?  and i. These three variables are 
jointly determined. There is no possibility of the kind of outcome analyzed in the text in which 
p* does not change when the RSP curve shifts. 
  

















RESULT 1.  Let p be distributed according to the continuously differentiable distribution function 
H(p). Then dy/dR ≥ 0, with strict equality in the limit as h(p*) → ∞. 
PROOF OF RESULT 1.   Differentiating y with respect to R gives 
 
(1-A)    
?𝑦
?𝑅   =  
𝜕𝑦
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                                                 of the                               bad projects         
                                                                                      innovation                                                         
 
where  D = R – i [1-W] - ?*[1-W]
??
??∗
   >  0. 
 
  (1-A)  expresses  dy/dR  as  the  sum  of  two  terms.  The  first  is  the  gain  holding  the 
composition of the industry fixed. The gain is the probability of undertaking a project multiplied 
by the average success rate of projects that are undertaken.  The second term is the loss due to 
the change in the composition of the industry.  This term is proportional to the social loss on the 
marginal entrant (p*R-r). 
The density of projects h* enters twice into the last term in equation (1-A):  once through 
∂y/∂p* =  - h*[p*R-r] (as shown), and a second time (not shown explicitly) through  dp*/dR = - 
p*/D.  The greater is h*, the greater the reduction in y due to a marginal change in p*.  However, 
through its effect on the interest rate, the greater is h*, the less the composition of the industry 
will change as a result of an increase in R.  This can be seen by writing D explicitly: 
 
 (2-A)    D = 
𝑅
?   {  ?  - 
?
𝑅 [1-W] + 
     ℎ∗        
1−𝐻∗  [? -?∗] 
?∗
?   
?
𝑅  [1-W] } 
 
 
using   di/dp* = −
?
?   
??  
??∗
   and  d? /dp*  =  
     ℎ∗        
1−𝐻∗  [? -?∗]. 
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?
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?




The last term inside the large square brackets is p*.  Rewriting that term using (5), it can be 




?𝑅   =    
1
? [1-H*] [? 𝑅 - ?(1-W)]   >   0    
  
which also means (since D → ∞  as h*→ ∞)  that  lim h*→∞  dy/dR  = 0. 
 
RESULT 2.  Let p be distributed according to the continuously differentiable distribution function 
H(p) on (0, pu).   Then dy/dΔ is ambiguous in sign.  
 
PROOF OF RESULT 2.   The result is proved if dy/dΔ is shown to be ambiguous in sign for any 
continuously  differentiable  distribution  function  of  p.    I  will  prove  the  result  for  a  uniform 
distribution  of  p.    Clearly,  allowing  a  non-uniform  distribution  of  types  (in  which  case  the 
density  for  the  marginal  type  could  be  arbitrarily  small  or  large)  would  greatly  expand  the 
conditions under which dy/dΔ was ambiguous in sign.  
But  assume  here  that  the  density  is  uniform  on  [0  ,  pu].    This  means  that  after  a 
productivity shock that shifts the success probability of every type by Δ, the density is  
 
h(p)  =   
1
?𝑢
 ≡ ℎ        for p  ∈  [∆ , pu+ ∆]    
   
 
and h(.) = 0 otherwise.   For a given value of p*, it follows that    
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             y   =   ℎ      (?𝑅 − ?) ??
?𝑢+∆
?∗  – e .       
 
Differentiating  y  with  respect  to  Δ  gives,  as  usual,  a  positive  effect  for  a  fixed 
composition of projects and a negative effect from the adverse change in the composition of 
projects that are undertaken.   
(4-A)      
?𝑦
?∆    =     
∂𝑦






?∆    
 
 
(5-A)            =   ℎ    ?𝑢 + ∆ 𝑅 − ?                         (Direct effect of the innovation) 
 
(6-A)               +  ℎ  [?∗𝑅 − ?∗] 
 [1−𝑊]?∗
 𝑅−?[1−𝑊]  
?
2?            (Effect of entry of bad projects) 
                                                             
The direct effect in (5-A) is determined by differentiating y at a fixed value of p*. The 
direct effect is the expected return on the highest-quality project multiplied by the density at that 
point.   
The indirect effect in (6-A) can be explained as follows.  Moving from right to left, an 
increase in Δ lowers the interest rate (by –r/2? 2), which, in turn, lowers p*.  (These effects are 
determined, respectively, by differentiating (2) with respect to Δ and differentiating (1) with 
respect to i.)  The first factor in expression (6-A) is obtained by differentiating y with respect to 
p*. From (5), p*R – r <  0, and so the indirect effect is negative.   
I now evaluate the net effect (the sign of (4-A)) in two cases.  In the first case, W→1.  It 
is easy to see that in this case, (6-A) approaches zero and so dy/d∆   > 0.   
In the second case, W < 1/3 and R is arbitrarily large.  Recall that the constraint that y ≥ 0 
implicitly defines a minimum lower bound on ? . This bound approaches zero as R becomes 
arbitrarily large (using (4)).  Since 0 < p* < ? , it follows that p*→ ?  as R becomes arbitrarily 
large. Recall from (1) that R-i(1-W) = rW/p* .  Using this fact, (4-A)-(6-A) imply that 
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As R becomes arbitrarily large, the left-hand side approaches 
?𝑢
?∗  (by l‘Hôpital‘s rule) and the 
squared expression on the right-hand side approaches one.   For W < 1/3, the first factor on the 
right-hand side is more than one.  Thus, the inequality is satisfied by choice of the parameter pu 
sufficiently small (so  pu/p* < [1-W]/2W ).  Intuitively, this case corresponds to a scenario in 
which the upside risk (R), from which the entrepreneur gains, is extremely large; whereas he 
bears little of the downside risk because his stake in his own project, W, is small.  In these 
circumstances, the ex ante surplus from investment, y, will be near zero and a marginal change in 
∆, by increasing adverse selection, will reduce the surplus further.  If the positive productivity 
shock reduces y below zero, then, of course, the shock will destroy the market.  
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